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From Periphery to Center: 
A Review of Edward C. Keefer and :Myra 
Foreign Relations of the United Burton, 
States, 
eds. 
1969-1976, val. 28: Southern Africa 
Ryan M. Irwin 
The history of southern Africa changed at 12:20 AM on April25, 1974. If at that moment you had been listening to Lisbon's Radio Renascen<;a, you'd have heard 
an eerie rendition of the song "Grandola, Vila Morena." 
Composed by musician Zeca Afonso two years earlier, the 
quiet ballad eulogized fraternity, democracy, and fairness-
values that had eroded under a forty-year dictatorship in 
Portugal. "It is the people who lead I Inside of you, oh city," 
Afonso sang. "It is the people who lead I In the shadow of 
a holm oak I Which no longer knew its age." His words 
announced the beginning of a carefully orchestrated 
military coup-months in the planning-against Prime 
Minister Marcelo Caetano, who had ruled the country since 
its previous dictator, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, suffered 
a stroke in 1968. Later named the Carnation Revolution, 
the affair was over within hours. Caetano accerted exile in 
Brazil; and a military junta, led first by Genera Antonio de 
Spinola and then Francisco da Costa Gomes, took the reins 
of government to establish a framework to end Portuguese 
colonialism in Africa and create a genuine democracy at 
home. When the junta disbanded two years later, Portugal 
was a fundamentally different country, and southern 
Africa-the region where so many anti-Caetano soldiers 
had fought and died in the name of empire-was being 
transformed by the dual imperatives of decolonization and 
superpower geopolitics. 
The coup unfolded in the shadow of the Watergate 
scandal, and it shows up as a memo-written by Henry 
Kissinger on April 29, 1974-about one-third of the way 
into Myra Burton's new Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1969-1976, vol. 28, Southern Africa. "A reorientation 
of Portugal away from Africa and toward Europe could 
be traumatic," Kissinger speculated to President Richard 
Nixon. However, he continued, there was "little reaction to 
[the coup] from the Portuguese territories of Africa," and 
the "local governments [were] urging business-as-usual" 
(98).1 His diagnosis hinted at the quiet before a storm. As 
Burton demonstrates, events in southern Africa consumed 
Washington during the next two years. Although Kissinger 
had derisively suggested in 1969 that "history [had] 
never been produced in the South," the region moved 
inexorably from the periphery to the center of U.S foreign 
relations after 1974.2 Whether in Angola, where Portuguese 
decolonization prompted an ill-fated U.S. covert operation 
that led to an acrimonious congressional investigation, or 
in Zimbabwe, where Kissinger became deeply involved in 
peace negotiations, top U.S. officials found it impossible 
to ignore the historical transformations that unfolded 
in tne wake of the Carnation Revolution. The region was 
the first great battleground of the post-Vietnam Cold 
War, and events there were the harbinger of changes that 
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would remake U.S. global power in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century. 
Burton's document collection is one of the better 
FRUS volumes I have read. By selectively blending policy 
statements and memoranda with meeting minutes and 
phone records, she rrovides the reader with a useful 
summary of official thinking and quotable anecdotes to 
illuminate the frustrations, eccentricities, and hubris of 
U.S. leaders. The collection is organized in four chapters 
that proceed chronologically and thematically. The first 
section, entitled "Regional Issues," covers the Nixon 
administration's early dealings with southern Africa, 
lingering on the formation of National Security Study 
Memorandum 39, which announced that regional change 
would only come through collaboration witn white rulers, 
and the passage of the so-called Byrd Amendment, which 
rolled back U.S. sanctions against Ian Smith's controversial 
government in Salisbury. The second and third sections 
flow together, covering Portuguese decolonization and 
the Angolan civil war between 1974 and 1976. Here, 
Burton expertly highlights the role of Zambia and Zaire 
in prodding the United States into action and illustrates 
how the Cold War helped distil a complex reality into 
easy bullet points in Washington. The volume ends with 
a section called "Independence Negotiations," which 
explores Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the region at the 
end of 1976. Eager perhaps to rehabilitate his reputation 
after the Angolan debacle, the secretary of state essentially 
renounced National Security Study Memorandum 39 and 
nudged Smith into indirect dialogue with Tanzania's Julius 
Nyerere, Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, and several of the 
liberation organizations, setting the stage for initiatives 
that carried into the Jimmy Carter administration. 
This period and region have already been examined in 
two of our field's more prominent international histories, 
Piero Gleijeses's Conflicting Missions (Chapel Hill, 2002) 
and Odd Arne Westad's The Global Cold War (Cambridge, 
2005). Burton's collection, in part, confirms the conclusions 
of these books. For instance, Gleijeses's once-controversial 
claim that Angola's MPLA had more support than UNITA 
or FNLA and therefore possessed more 1egitimacy than its 
rivals is tacitly confirmed by U.S. consular cables, meetings 
minutes, and policy documents. Kissinger was at his most 
cynical in 1975. Although he made no secret of his belief 
that the "history of Africa [had] shown that a nation's only 
focal point [was] the capital" (113) and admitted that the 
MPLA controlled Luanda and most of Angola's populated 
areas (135), the secretary nonetheless moved against 
conventional wisdom in Washington and put America's 
weight behind an illogical covert operation that ended in 
disaster. "What real choice do we have?" he queried blandly 
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as CIA funds flowed into the region that summer. "I know 
the AF bureau says that [Africans] care about economic 
aid, but there's no empirical evidence for that" (111). The 
subsequent civil war lasted twenty-five years, left 500,000 
Angolans dead, and put the MPLA (eventually) at the helm 
of a country engulfed by AIDS and ethnic strife. Could this 
bloodshed and devastation have been avoided without U.S. 
meddling? Reading Burton's collection, it is hard not to 
marvel at Kissinger's callousness: 
William Hyland [INR Director]: We will have a 
problem of answering critics. 
Kissinger: I'm relaxed .... So what if critics 
attack us, we can't be faulted. What grounds 
would they use? 
H: They can claim that we are perpetuating 
war by arming the people; that we will turn a 
civil conflict into a bloodbath. 
K: What would they have us do, abandon the 
country to the Communists? (123) 
For culturalists, there is suggestive evidence that 
racism influenced U.S. policy thinking. Especially in the 
early years, when Wasnington was so intent on rejecting 
African initiatives at the United Nations, Nixon and 
Kissinger refer to Africans casually as cannibals, savages, 
and uneducated na1fs. "Mobutu I think is a semi-savage," 
Kissinger stated casually at the height of the Angolan 
crisis in 1975. "You can say we gave [FNLA's] Roberto 
[dollar amount not declassified] but he didn't need money, but 
strategy. Does Mobutu know strategy?" (111). Yet many of 
the African politicians Kissinger dealt with were shrewd 
rhetoricians who flirted dexterously with the meaning of 
words and knew how to manipulate an audience. "When 
I come to Africa, you'll attack American imperialism?" 
the secretary asked Zambia's foreign minister in late 1975. 
"Yes," the minister responded, "so they'll listen to the rest! 
[Laughter]" (150). 
A deeper conceptual question shapes this well-crafted 
collection: Did the United States actually shape events in 
southern Africa or did it follow the initiatives of others? 
For Gleijeses, of course, the United States was "in the lead" 
by the mid-1970s, "flanked by Zaire and South Africa," 
with England and France "at the rear."3 But this is not the 
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only possible conclusion. As Burton shows, at the height 
of the Angolan crisis, Kissinger's support of UNITA and 
FNLA stemmed primarily from ongoing conversations 
with Zambia's Kaunda and Zaire's Mobutu, who lamented 
MPLA's Agostinho Neto and saw U.S. action as a means to 
influence their new neighbor. Only moments after calling 
Mobutu a semi-savage, the secretary declared, "[First,J 
we consider Zaire one of the two or three key countries 
in Africa. Two, we consider him one of the two or three 
key leaders in Africa. Three, we want to cooperate with 
him" (111). Washington's subsequent covert aid went 
not to UNITA and FNLA but to Mobutu's government; 
and Kissinger rarely pursued goals that were wholly 
inconsonant with tne recommendations of the frontline 
states, especially after 1974. The situation on the ground-
even the existential issue of communism-was secondary 
to America's "credibility" with Zaire and South Africa, as 
well as Zambia and Tanzania. 
What are the implications of these documents for 
U.S. foreign relations history? Was the region an outlier 
or microcosm of wider ~lobal trends? And how should 
we remember Kissinger s tenure as secretary of state? 
Hopefully these questions will find answers in the coming 
years as historians devote more attention to this period, 
region, and volume. Whether employing the theoretical 
framework of empire or writing in the classic mode of 
diplomatic history, they will have many reasons to pick 
up Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. 28, 
Southern Africa. Congratulations to Burton on a job well 
done. 
Notes: 
1. Numbers in parentheses refer to documents rather than 
pages. 
2. Cited by Mark Atwood Lawrence, "History from Below: The 
United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years," in Nixon 
in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, eds. Fredrik 
Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford, UK, 2008), 269. 
3. Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and 
Africa, 1959- 1976 (Chapel Hill, 2002), 293. 
PASSPORT Apri/2013 
